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INTRODUCTION
On July 21, 2010, a young mother in Ocala, Florida brought her
four-month-old daughter to see their family pediatrician, Dr. Chris
Okonkwo, for her shots and a routine wellness check-up.1 During the
course of the examination, Dr. Okonkwo asked the mother of his patient
a simple question—a question regularly asked of parents of young
children in pediatric check-ups: “Do you keep a gun in the house?”2 In
doing so, he unwittingly sparked sudden media attention3 and inspired
speeches on the floor of the Florida House of Representatives,4
eventually culminating in the Governor of Florida signing into law an
unprecedented bill,5 which limits doctors ability to ask patients or their
guardians questions regarding their gun ownership, and has since
spawned six other state legislatures to introduce similar proposals.6
Upon the woman’s refusal to answer and claim that her privacy
rights were invaded by the question, Dr. Okonkwo advised the mother
of three that she had thirty days to find a new pediatrician and was not
1 Fred Hiers, Family and Pediatrician Tangle Over Gun Question, STAR-BANNER, July 23,
2010,
available
at
http://www.ocala.com/article/20100723/news/100729867/1402/news?p=1&tc=pg;
see
also
CS/CB/HB 155, Final Bill Analysis, June 28, 2001, at 2 available at
http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/Documents/loaddoc.aspx?FileName=h0155z.JDC.DOC
X&DocumentType=Analysis&BillNumber=0155&Session=2011.
2 See Hiers, supra note 1.
3 Id.
4 See Final Bill Analysis, supra note 1.
5 Press Release, Senator Greg Evers, The Florida Senate, Legislation to Protect Second
Amendment Rights Signed into Law: House Bill 155 and House Bill 45 Signed by Governor Rick
Scott
(June
2,
2011),
available
at
http://www.gregevers.com/releases/06032011_LegSignedIntoLaw.htm.
6 See infra notes 185–191 and accompanying text.
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welcome back at Children’s Health of Ocala, where he was the medical
director.7 The inflammatory inquiry arose as part of a series of health
and safety questions routinely asked in doctors’ offices nationwide—
often tailored by the physician depending upon the patient—in order to
provide preventative care, as well as health and safety guidance.8
This Note argues that the resulting legislation, an undeniably
controversial9 Florida statute entitled “Medical Privacy Concerning
Firearms,” created by the Firearm Owners’ Privacy Act (“the Act”),10
cannot withstand a First Amendment challenge under existing United
States Supreme Court jurisprudence. Under Supreme Court case law,
the First Amendment right to freedom of speech11 routinely trumps
innumerable state statutes, regulations, and ordinances that control,
burden, or suppress communication based upon content.12 Thus, not
surprisingly, shortly after the Act’s passage, it was challenged in the
District Court for the Southern District of Florida.13 The plaintiff
physicians in that case won a preliminary injunction against the
government, barring the Act’s enforcement.14 The following year, the
preliminary injunction became permanent pursuant to a subsequent

7 Dr. Okonkwo explained later to the Star-Banner newspaper that the doctor-patient
relationship requires trust and if parents refuse to answer basic safety questions, they certainly
will not trust one another regarding larger health issues either. See Hiers, supra note 1; Final Bill
Analysis, supra note 1. The court, in issuing the preliminary injunction, explained in the
Background section that the State’s legislative history points to the law being passed “in reaction
to an incident in Ocala.” Wollschlaeger v. Farmer, 814 F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1372 (S.D. Fla. 2011).
8 For instance, Dr. Okonkwo asks young drivers about cell phone use while driving and asks
parents of young children if they have a swimming pool, so he can provide advice to prevent
accidental drowning. See Hiers, supra note 1.
9 In a physician-penned essay, it was argued that the law places limits on prevention, which
is routinely taught in medical schools. The physician also pointed out the law places her
pediatrician colleagues “in a legal predicament,” as the “law conflicts with accepted medical
practices,” such that doctors now worry they risk a malpractice claim if they fail to ask about gun
ownership or access and a patient is then subsequently injured by a firearm in the home. Erin N.
Marcus, Gun Query Off Limits For Doctors in Florida, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2011, at D5.
10 CS/CS/HB 155; codified at Fla. Stats. §§ 790.338, 381.026, 456,072, 395.1055.
11 The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “Congress shall make
no law [] abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. CONST. amend. I, § 1.
12 See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011) (invalidating the Vermont
Prescription Confidentiality Law which forbid the disclosure of prescriber-identifying
information as an unconstitutional content- and speaker-based restriction); Brown v. Entm’t
Merch. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011) (finding that a California state statute restricting the sale of
violent video games to minors was a content-based burden on freedom of speech lacking a
compelling government interest and, as such, was unconstitutional); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312
(1988) (striking down a District of Columbia provision forbidding the display of signs criticizing
foreign governments within 500 feet of embassies as a content-based restriction lacking sufficient
tailoring); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748 (1976) (holding that a Virginia statute restricting pharmacists from disclosing certain drug
pricing information violated the First Amendment).
13 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Wollschlaeger v. Scott, 814 F. Supp. 2d
1367 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (No. 11-22026-Civ).
14 Wollschlaeger v. Farmer, 814 F. Supp. 2d 1367 (S.D. Fla. 2011).
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district court opinion issued in June 2012.15 The State promptly
appealed the district court’s decision to the Eleventh Circuit, where the
case remains pending,having heard oral arguments July 18, 2013.16
The district judge’s opinions granting preliminary and permanent
injunctions conform to the existing Supreme Court standard for First
Amendment challenges. Under this current standard, the Supreme
Court’s analysis of content-based suppression of speech places the crux
of the examination upon the purported government interest and the
degree to which the law is tailored to further that government interest or
goal.17
However, this Note argues that the standard ought to be
recalibrated in cases such as this one, where the speech being “chilled”
would potentially benefit the health, safety, or welfare of the would-be
listener or recipient of the information. That health, safety, or welfare
factor, rather than falling into a free-floating policy rationale, or being
just one of many “considerations,”18 should carry actual analytic weight
in the adjudicative standard going forward for any free speech case
where a cognizable value of the communication exists for the would-be
recipient.
The standard First Amendment analysis, when facing a
government entity attempting to restrict speech based upon content,
requires the court to subject the statute to strict judicial scrutiny.19 The
Supreme Court’s current strict-scrutiny standard of review examines
whether there is a compelling government interest at stake—requiring
proof that the suppression of speech is necessary to that interest—and
demands that the statute be narrowly drawn towards furthering or
protecting that interest.20 As such, and at issue here, the government’s
interest ought to be further subjected to an examination of the
suppressed speech from the viewpoint of the deprived recipient, when a
lack of such information affects the health, safety, and welfare of the
listener—especially here, where such information is beneficial to the
welfare of vulnerable children.
Applying this Note’s proposed additional inquiry to the Firearm
Owners’ Privacy Act would further eviscerate any purported Second
Amendment “compelling interest,” and significantly strengthen the case
15
16

Wollschlaeger v. Farmer, 880 F. Supp. 2d 1251 (S.D. Fla. 2012).
Wollschlaeger v. Farmer, 880 F. Supp. 2d 1251 (S.D. Fla. 2012), appeal docketed sub nom,
Wollschlaeger v. Governor State of Florida, No. 12-14009 (11th Cir. Aug. 2, 2012); see also Jay
Weaver, No decision in round two of ‘Docs vs. Glocks’ in Miami federal appeals court, MIAMI
HERALD, July 18, 2013.
17 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 395 (1992).
18 Judge Cooke, in balancing the interests, includes the potential harm to the listener as part of
the “considerations” that ultimately favor upholding the physicians’ “ability to speak freely to
their patients.” Wollschlaeger, 880 F. Supp. 2d at 1267.
19 Id.; see also Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011).
20 Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2738.
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for facial unconstitutionality of the Act. A possible criticism, of course,
is that the standard requires the Court to make an overly value-laden
judgment, given that the basic theory of First Amendment jurisprudence
is antithetical to the idea of the government evaluating or weighing the
content of various communications.21 However, this proposed standard
for triggering highly-valued speech worthy of the utmost protection is
limited to rare instances implicating the listener’s health, safety, and
welfare. In fact, the health, safety, and welfare principal is already
invoked often, as courts frequently are called upon to delineate between
what does and does not establish a cognizable threat to citizens under a
state’s police power. Further, free speech jurisprudence itself has
morphed into a hierarchy of speech based upon “value,” with political
and religious speech being treated as “high value” speech compared to
“low value” false statements or pornography.22
Part I of this Note provides background on the Act at issue, its
legislative history, the current status of the Supreme Court’s free speech
jurisprudence, and it also introduces the constitutional interests at stake.
Part II considers the constitutionality of the Act under the existing First
Amendment standard and addresses the State’s assertions under the
Second Amendment. Part III proposes that the Court’s standard ought to
be recalibrated, taking into account the would-be listeners’ cognizable
interest in the information. Part III goes on to legitimate the proposal by
reconciling this new examination standard with existing free speech
jurisprudence and justifications, along with a brief exposition of the
likeness between the Note’s proposal and the doctrine of informed
consent.
I. BACKGROUND
A. An Act Relating to the Privacy of Firearm Owners
The Firearm Owners’ Privacy Act is the hotly contested Florida
statute—now dubbed the “Physician Gag Law”—which rests at the
forefront of the so-called “Docs v. Glocks” litigation.23 Originating in
the Florida House of Representatives, House Bill 155 became Florida
Statute Section 790.338 under the pen of Governor Rick Scott on June
2, 201124—despite the vehement opposition of many physicians’
21 Cf. T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 326 (1970) (arguing that the
Court should not be making “value judgments” on the content of the expressed speech, as a “role
foreclosed to it by the basic theory of the First Amendment”).
22 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 986–87, (3rd
ed. 2006).
23 Nathan Koppel, Florida Judge Sides With Physicians in ‘Docs v. Glocks’ Case, WALL
STREET JOURNAL LAW BLOG, Sept 15, 2011, http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/09/15/florida-judgesides-with-physicians-in-docs-v-glocks-case/.
24 See Press Release, supra note 5. The NRA hailed the legislation as “pro-gun,” explaining
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groups. By signing the House and Senate supported bill, the Tea Party25
backed Governor ushered the Firearm Owner’s Privacy Act into law.26
The National Rifle Association of America (“NRA”)—in particular its
lobbyist arm the Institute for Legislative Action27—was a driving force
behind the enactment of the legislation, sending out notices urging
members to contact the Governor in support of the Bill, which it
explained “would STOP pediatricians from invading privacy rights” of
their firearm-owning patients.28 The NRA lauded the Act, arguing that
the Act provided NRA members protection against discrimination and
intrusive inquiries due to their firearm ownership.29 Further, and most
that HB 155 “stops pediatricians from invading privacy rights of gun owners and bringing antigun politics into medical examining rooms.” The press release goes on to admit that the law is
being challenged in court. See Press Release, Institute for Legislative Action, National Rifle
Association of America, 2011 Florida Legislative Session Ends With Three Pro-Gun Bills Signed
into Law (June 30, 2011), http://www.NRAILA.org/Legislation/Read.aspx?id=7096.
25 The American Tea Party is a relatively recent political phenomenon. Begun in 2009, the
grassroots movement purports to be anti-government and proved instrumental to the Republicans’
success in the 2010 mid-term elections. See generally Tea Party Movement, N.Y. TIMES,
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/t/tea_party_movement/index.html?in
line=nyt-classifier (last visited June 25, 2013). The American Tea Party Patriots claim to be a
non-partisan grassroots movement, the impetus for which was “excessive government spending
TEA
PARTY,
and
taxation.”
See,
e.g.,
Mission,
GREENWICH
http://www.greenwichteaparty.com/Mission.html (last visited June 25, 2013). One of their core
values is listed as “Constitutionally Limited Government,” insisting that they “support the
personal liberty of the individual, within the rule of law.” See Mission Statement and Core
Values, Tea Party Patriots: Official Home of the American Tea Party Movement, available at
https://docs.google.com/View?id=dhsxmzm7_19fcdzskg5 (last visited June 25, 2013). Scott ran
on a Tea Party-endorsed platform of fiscal conservatism and radical budget cuts, winning the
gubernatorial race despite his lack of political experience. See Don Van Natta & Gary Fineout,
Sinking Poll Numbers May Put Florida in Play, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2011, at A12. However, by
May 2011, one month before signing the Firearm Owners’ Privacy Act into law, Scott had the
lowest approval rating of any governor, at only 29%, mirrored by an almost-as-dire 35% approval
rating of Florida State Legislature. Press Release, Quinnipiac University Polling Institute, Florida
Voters Turn Thumbs Down on Gov. Scott 2-1, Quinnipiac University Poll Finds; Voters Say
Property Insurance is Getting Worse (May 25, 2011).
26 Wollschlaeger v. Farmer, 814 F. Supp. 2d 1367 (S.D. Fla. 2011).
27 The Institute for Legislative Action is the lobbyist arm of the NRA, with a staff of over
eighty employees and a team consisting of full-time lobbyists “defending Second Amendment
issues on Capitol Hill, in state legislatures and in local government bodies.” About NRA-ILA,
NAT’L RIFLE ASS’N OF AMERICA, INST. FOR LEGIS. ACTION, http://www.nraila.org/about-nraila.aspx (last visited June 25, 2013). It involves itself with any issue, directly or indirectly,
affecting firearm owners, often alerting its members and supporters when legislation is pending,
urging them to respond “with individual letters, faxes, e-mails and calls to their elected
representatives to make their views known.” Id.
28 The e-mail categorizes HN 155 as a “Second Amendment bill” and warns members that
“[t]he American Academy of Pediatrics and the Florida Pediatric Society are reported to be
waging a campaign to get Governor Scott to veto HB 155” and encourages them to e-mail the
Governor, urging him to sign the bill. See Letter from Marion P. Hammer, USF Executive
Director, to USF & NRA Members and Friends, Urgent Alert- Contact Florida Governor Rick
Scott Today! (May 26, 2011).
29 Proposed Intervener National Rifle Association’s Motion to Intervene and Incorporated
Memorandum of Law, Wollschlaeger v. Scott, 814 F. Supp. 2d 1367 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (No. 1122026-Civ), 2011 WL 4074925; see also Order Denying National Rifle Association’s Motion to
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tellingly for the purposes of a freedom of speech claim, the NRA
assured its members the Act would preemptively discourage doctors
from even asking any such firearm-related questions at all.30
Meanwhile, similar NRA-backed bills were introduced in 2011 in the
legislatures of Alabama, Minnesota, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and
West Virginia.31
Four days after the Governor put pen to paper, several Florida
physicians and physician interest groups challenged the constitutionality
of the statute under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief in the District Court for Florida’s
Southern District.32 Throughout the course of the litigation, the
plaintiffs have based their challenge upon three grounds: facial
unconstitutionality under the freedom of speech doctrine, overly vague
statutory language,33 and overly broad potential applicability.34
Turning to the statutory text itself, embodied in the provision
“Medical privacy concerning firearms; prohibitions; penalties; and
exceptions,” the challenged (and thus relevant) portions prescribe that a
health care practitioner “may not intentionally enter any disclosed
information concerning firearm ownership into the patient’s medical
record if the practitioner knows such information is not relevant to the
patient’s medical care, or safety, or safety of others;” “should refrain
from making a written inquiry or asking questions concerning the
ownership of a firearm” unless he or she “in good faith believes that this
information is relevant to the patient’s medical care or safety, or the
safety of others;” “shall respect a patient’s legal right to own or possess
Intervene, Wollschlaeger v. Scott, 814 F. Supp. 2d 1367 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (No. 11-22026-Civ.),
2011 WL 2672250 (denying the Motion to Intervene on the grounds that the NRA failed to show
that the Governor and other existing defendants will not adequately represent their interests, as
evidenced by the fact that Governor Scott himself signed the bill at issue into law).
30 See Hammer Letter, supra note 28.
31 See infra notes 174–84 and accompanying text.
32 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Wollschlaeger v. Scott, 814 F. Supp. 2d.
1367 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (No. 11-CV22026-Civ.), 2011 WL 2177374; see also Brief for Appellees,
Wollschlaeger v. Governor, State of Fla., No. 12-14009 (11th Cir. 2012).
33 Wollschlaeger v. Farmer, 814 F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1377 (S.D. Fla. 2011). The vagueness
doctrine, which rests upon fundamental due process concerns, will render a statute facially void if
the law, as written, does not clearly delineate between proscribed conduct and that which is
acceptable. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1116 (Stone et al., eds., 6th ed., 2009). In the First
Amendment context, vagueness is of particular concern, as it implicates “sensitive areas of basic
First Amendment freedoms,” and a lack of clarity may cause would-be speakers to “steer far
wider of the unlawful zone”—in effect chilling constitutionally protected speech. See Grayned v.
City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108–09 (1972); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964);
Cramp v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 287 (1961); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note
22, at 941–42.
34 Wollschlaeger, 814 F. Supp. 2d at 1377. An overbreadth challenge, although lacking “an
exact definition,” generally requires proving that the law is substantially overbroad and as applied
in numerous situations, will “significantly compromise recognized First Amendment
protections.” City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 800–01 (1984); see
generally Richard Fallen, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L. J. 853 (1991).
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a firearm and should refrain from unnecessarily harassing a patient
about firearm ownership.”35 A limited exemption is granted for an
emergency medical technician or paramedic who “in good faith,
believes that information regarding the possession of a firearm by the
patient or the presence of a firearm in the home” is “necessary to treat a
patient during the course and scope of a medical emergency or that the
presence or possession of a firearm would pose an imminent danger or
threat to the patient or others.”36 The statute provides that any violation
of subsections (1)-(4) is grounds for disciplinary action by the Florida
State Medical Board under Florida Statutes Section 456.072(2) and
Section 395.1055.37
The Attorney General of Florida, in opposition to the injunction,
put forth a narrow reading of the statute in an attempt to salvage it. The
State argued that the law did not actually forbid physicians from
questioning their patients38 and that the statutory language was not an
outright proscription on doctors’ speech.39 Further, the State urged that
the Act should be read reasonably by the court, as not putting any
burden on conversations between a doctor and his patient, but instead as
only applicable to forced disclosures of information by patients.40
On September 14, 2011, District Court Judge Marcia G. Cooke
issued an order granting the plaintiffs’ preliminary injunction based
upon the statute’s facial unconstitutionality under the First
Amendment.41 The court rejected the State’s reading of the statute as
merely a recommendation for physicians, reasoning it would create an
absurd result in which penalties clearly delineated in the statute would
cease to carry any functional value.42 Once Judge Cooke categorized the
Act as burdening doctors’ speech based upon content, the Judge found
the Act could not survive strict scrutiny: the Second Amendment and
patients’ privacy rights justifications were insufficiently “compelling”
government interests, and the State failed to prove the statute was

35
36
37

FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 790.338 (1), (2), (6) (2011).
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.338(3) (2011).
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.338(8) (2011). “Grounds for discipline; penalties; enforcement (1)
The following acts shall constitute grounds for which the disciplinary actions specified in
subsection (2) may be taken . . . (nn) Violating any of the provisions of s. 790.338.” FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 456.072(1). The statute also provides that when the Board finds any person guilty on the
grounds, the Board may, amongst others penalties, suspend or permanently revoke the offender’s
license or impose an administrative maximum fine of $10,000 for each offense. FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 456.072(2)(b) & (d) (2011).
38 Response of Defendants to Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Wollschlaeger v. Farmer,
814 F. Supp. 2d 1367 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (No. 1:11-cv-22026-MGC), 2011 WL 4074928; see also
Brief for Appellees, Wollschlaeger v. Governor, State of Fla., No. 12-14009 (11th Cir. 2012).
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Wollschlaeger v. Farmer, 814 F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1377 (S.D. Fla. 2011).
42 Id. at 1376.
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narrowly tailored, and necessary, to serve those interests.43
The injunction became permanent on June 29, 2012, by order of
Judge Cooke, who reiterated much of her earlier opinion and summarily
rejected the State’s new attempt to “recast” the statute as “a run-of-themill anti-discrimination law.”44
B. The Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence of First Amendment
Freedom of Speech
The text of the First Amendment may be sparse, but the language
“Congress shall make no law [] abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press”45 has successfully invalidated countless state statutes.46 In
particular, the constitutionality of a statute that implicates freedom of
speech often hinges upon its potential for the suppression of speech
based on content, which triggers strict scrutiny.47 So deep does this
principle run and so fiercely protected is the free speech doctrine, that in
the recently decided case of United States v. Stevens, the Supreme Court
held that the State’s suggestion of analyzing content-based speech rights
under a mere balancing test was “startling and dangerous. . . . The First
Amendment itself reflects a judgment by the American people that the
benefits of its restrictions on the Government outweigh the costs.”48
While the freedom of speech is not an absolute right, the categories
of unprotected speech—those that have been deemed as lacking in any
social value or importance and therefore fall “outside” the area of
protected speech49—are limited and drawn narrowly,50 to include
obscenity, incitement, and fighting words.51
Additionally, amongst the universe of protected speech, the
Supreme Court has essentially stratified expression by value,
articulating that not all speech is of equal importance under the First

43 Id. at 1380–83; see also Wollschlaeger v. Farmer, 880 F. Supp. 2d 1251 (S.D. Fla. 2012)
(holding that the statute failed to survive under either strict scrutiny or a somewhat less
demanding standard urged by the State and thus declining to decide exactly which standard
applies).
44 Wollschlaeger, 880 F. Supp. 2d at 1256; see also Response of Defendants to Motion for
Summary Judgment, Wollschlaeger v. Farmer, 880 F. Supp. 2d 1251 (S.D. Fla. 2012), 2011 WL
4074928.
45 U.S. CONST. amend. I, § 1.
46 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 12 and accompanying text.
47 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002) (explaining that, in general, “the government
has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its
content”).
48 United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1585 (2010).
49 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); see also Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568, 571–72.
50 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571–72.
51 Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011).
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Amendment.52 The Court recognizes that certain speech, such as speech
“on matters of public concern,” political expression, and religious
speech is entitled to greater protection, as “high” value speech.53 On the
opposite end of the spectrum, speech determined to be “low” valued
speech includes, for example, false statements of fact,54 commercial
advertising and communications,55 and pornography.56 All other speech
is accorded full protection by the Court, so long as it does not fall into
the delineated categories of “low value” expression.57
Further, a statute resulting in content-based burdening of speech is
presumptively invalid and, as such, is subject to strict scrutiny, meaning
the State must prove a compelling government interest and that the
statute is drawn narrowly to address that interest.58 The Supreme Court
has maintained that “[i]t’s rare that a regulation restricting speech
because of its content will ever be permissible.”59 As such, the
Government bears the burden of pointing to an “actual problem” that
must be rectified,60 and proving that the resulting government
infringement of one’s right to free speech is necessary to the solution.61
A state may not suppress the dissemination of information because it is
“fearful of that information’s effect upon its disseminators and its
recipients.”62 Offensive opinions, or unwelcome speech, are
nevertheless still protected forms of expression—unpopular
communications are often those most in need of constitutional

52
53
54

Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
Id. at 758–59.
N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Professor Nimmer argues that the N.Y. Times
decision involved a “balancing process” by weighing “competing policy considerations” in the
Court’s categorical assignations. See Melville B. Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to
Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CAL. L. REV. 935,
942–43 (1968).
55 Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (describing commercial
expression has receiving “limited measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate
position in the scale of First Amendment values”).
56 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 33, at 1129.
57 David A. Strauss, Freedom of Speech & the Common-Law Constitution, in ETERNALLY
VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 33, 37 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone,
eds., 2002).
58 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395 (1992); see also Gitlow v. New York, 268
U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (holding that the First Amendment right to free speech is a fundamental
personal right as defined by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; as such it is
applicable to both federal and state governmental action alike); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10–
11 (1964) (holding that the same standard applies to both federal and state encroachment upon
“personal rights”).
59 Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011) (quoting United States v.
Playboy, 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000)).
60 See Playboy, 529 U.S. at 822–23.
61 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 395.
62 Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
773 (1976).
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protection.63 Notably, the Supreme Court has stressed repeatedly that
“distinction between laws burdening and laws banning speech is but a
matter of degree.”64
A state will often, in an attempt to salvage its statute, argue the
canon of constitutional avoidance—a tool of statutory interpretation
whereby ambiguous language will be reasonably construed, or limited,
to avoid unconstitutional results.65 However, this requires that the
statute be “readily susceptible” to a narrower construction.66 Particularly
within the arena of free speech, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
declined to “rewrite” the law under the guise of reinterpretation.67
The Supreme Court’s historically hard-line approach to any
suppression of speech based on content is writ large in the 2011
decisions of Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association68 and
Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc.69 In Brown, the Supreme Court struck down
as unconstitutional a California statute restricting the sale of violent
video games to minors. Despite studies suggesting a connection
between exposure to these graphic games and their harmful effects on
children, the Court nevertheless concluded “ambiguous proof will not
suffice.”70 Nor was the government’s interest in protecting children
from depictions of violence found sufficiently compelling to justify
burdening speech because “there are all sorts of ‘problems’ . . . that
cannot be addressed by governmental restriction of free expression.”71
The Court rejected the State’s argument that its statute was a justifiable
aid to parental authority, explaining that punishing third parties for
conveying otherwise-protected speech to minors, of which parents may
not approve, is not a valid exercise of a state’s police power.72
Likewise, the Supreme Court in Sorrell struck down on First
Amendment grounds a Vermont statute, the Prescription Confidentiality
Law, which restricted the release or sale of physicians’ prescribing
preferences and information to drug marketers.73 Ironically, the State’s
purported justifications for the statute—which ultimately proved
63 “[I]f it is the speaker’s opinion that gives offense, that consequence is a reason for
according it constitutional protection.” FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745 (1978).
64 Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2664 (2011) (quoting Playboy, 529 U.S. at
812) (further stating that “Government’s content-based burdens must satisfy the same rigorous
scrutiny as its content-based bans”).
65 See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009); see also United States
v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1591–92 (2010).
66 Virginia v. Am. Bookseller’s Ass’n., Inc., 484 U.S. 383, 397 (1988).
67 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 884 (1997) (quoting Virginia, 484 U.S. at 397); see also
Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1591–92.
68 Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).
69 Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
70 Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2739.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 2740.
73 Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2660 (emphasis added).
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unpersuasive—were protection of doctors who may have “felt coerced
and harassed”74 and safeguarding medical privacy,75 (not unlike
Florida’s justifications for the Firearm Owners’ Privacy Act, ostensibly
enacted to shield gun owners from physician-harassment and protect
their privacy rights).76 As the Court explained “[a] physician’s office is
no more private and is entitled to no greater protection.”77 Finding the
law burdened speech based upon the content and the speaker, the Court
determined it simply could not survive the stringent strict scrutiny
standard.78
C. Legislative History of the Bill
The Final Analysis of the Privacy of Firearm Owners Act reveals
that the bill grew out of the incident described above in the Introduction
in which a pediatrician, as part of his routine wellness check-up
examination, asked his patient’s mother about guns in her home “in an
effort to provide safety advice” and in conjunction with other
preventative health and safety questions.79 Upon her refusal to answer,
as she felt that her privacy had been invaded, the doctor advised her she
had thirty days to find a new pediatrician.80 This occurrence, along with
other anecdotal stories and comments from legislators who had “heard
about” this type of discrimination,81 purportedly formed the bedrock of
the statute.82
The legislative history locates the purpose squarely within the
realm of content-based suppression, a motive that further implicates
viewpoint-based discrimination. The House of Representatives Staff
Analysis from the Criminal Justice Subcommittee reveals that in an
earlier draft of the statute there was a narrow category of exceptions for
“permissible” inquiry, which were not a violation of Section 790.338.83
74
75
76

Id. at 2669.
Id. at 2659.
Response of Defendant’s to Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Wollschlaeger v. Farmer,
814 F. Supp. 2d 1367 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (No 1:11-cv-22026-MGC).
77 Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2670; see also Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975)
(rejecting the State’s justification for suppression of speech based on privacy rights of
individuals, limiting such exceptions to instances where “the speaker intrudes on the privacy of
the home,” or where “the degree of captivity makes it impractical for the unwilling viewer or
auditor to avoid exposure”).
78 Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2672.
79 CS/CB/HB 155, Final Bill Analysis, June 28, 2001, at 2, available at
http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/Documents/loaddoc.aspx?FileName=h0155z.JDC.DOC
X&DocumentType=Analysis&BillNumber=0155&Session=2011.
80 Id.
81 See Response of Defendants to Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Wollschlaeger v.
Farmer, 814 F. Supp. 2d 1367 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (No. 1:11-cv-22026-MGC), 2011 WL 4074928
(citing Audio CD: Regular Session House Floor Debate on HB 155, at 13:40, Florida House of
Representatives, “House Floor Debate,” (remarks of Rep. Brodeur) (April 26, 2011)).
82 See Wollschlaeger v. Farmer, 880 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1256 (S.D. Fla. 2012).
83 CS/HB 155 Privacy of Firearms Owners, House Representatives Staff Analysis, March 9,
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However, these exceptions “do not apply to inquiries made due to a
person’s general belief that firearms or ammunition are harmful to
health or safety.” Such a differentiation, by singling-out and burdening
speech based upon the speaker’s gun-control beliefs suggest an
underlying attempt to restrict physicians based not only on the content
of their speech, but further on their viewpoint.
In fact, the legislative history even reveals an anticipatory
awareness of possible free speech constitutional challenges to the
proposed bill.84 Yet despite the documented recognition of a potential
constitutional infirmity, House Bill 155 sailed through the legislature.
The Privacy of Firearm Owners bill navigated the House Criminal
Justice Subcommittee, the Health and Human Services Committee, and
the Judiciary Committee before easily passing the House Vote with 88
Yeas to 30 Nays, and emerged from the Senate vote two days later with
27 Yeas to 10 Nos.85
D. The Physicians’ and Patients’ Interests
While initially a doctor’s need to discuss gun ownership with
patients, or their parents, may seem out of place and unnecessary,
deeper analysis proves it to be indispensable. In fact, the American
Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) and the American Academy of Family
Physicians (AAFP) both recommend doctors provide health and safety
guidance, engaging patients or their guardians in discussions meant to
serve as preventative care.86 The AAP Committee on Injury and Poison
Prevention urged pediatricians and health care professionals to include
questions about gun ownership and safety when taking a patient’s
history, having found that loaded and unlocked firearms “represent a
serious danger to children and adolescents.”87 In November 2011, the
American Medical Association (AMA) passed Resolution 201 in
response to the Florida Act, adopting an official policy to “vigorously
and actively” oppose any law or restriction on doctors’ ability to freely

2011
at
4,
available
at
http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/Documents/loaddoc.aspx?FileName=h0155a.CRJS.DO
CX&DocumentType=Analysis&BillNumber=0155&Session=2011.
84 Id.
85 CS/CS/HB 155-Privacy of Firearm Owners, Selected Bill Detail, Florida House of
Representatives,
(last
visited
Sept
26,
2011),
available
at
http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/Bills/billsdetail.aspx?BillId=44993&SessionIndex=1&SessionId=66&BillText=&BillNumber=155&BillSponsorIndex=0&BillListIndex=0&BillStat
uteText=&BillTypeIndex=0&BillReferredIndex=0&HouseChamber=B&BillSearchIndex=0.
86 See Wollschlaeger v. Farmer, 814 F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1373 (S.D. Fla. 2011).
87 Firearm-Related Injuries Affecting the Pediatric Population, Committee on Injury and
Poison Prevention, American Academy of Pediatrics, 105 PEDIATRICS 888, 893 (2000) (finding
that “[b]ecause firearm-related injury to children is associated with death and severe morbidity
and is a significant public health problem, child health care professionals can and should provide
effective leadership in efforts to stem this epidemic”).
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inquire about and discuss firearm safety with their patients.88
Preventative care and anticipatory guidance routinely fall within
the purview of modern medical practice and scientific studies suggest
that guns in the home pose a quantifiable danger and health risk.89
Moreover, the presence of children in the home does not necessarily
lead parents to engage in safer firearm storage. One study by Dr. Susan
Connor, published in the official journal of the American Academy of
Pediatrics (AAP), found that in homes containing both children and
firearms, only twenty percent reported having their guns locked or
locked up.90 As such, Dr. Connor concluded that “one-size-fits-all
interventions” were ineffectual and that physicians tailoring their
messages to patients and their families was necessary.91
A subsequent follow-up study to Dr. Connor’s work, also
published by the AAP, went on to conclude that physicians should
engage in a “tailored safe storage counseling approach,” which ought to
include not only inquiries into ownership, but also information about the
types of guns present.92 Researchers have found that even brief office
counseling by a family physician causes significant positive effects:
patients who received verbal counseling on firearm safety practices
from their doctor were three times more likely to make safety changes,
compared to firearm-owning peers who were denied such physician
counseling.93
A 2002 survey conducted by state health departments in
conjunction with the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
estimated that in the State of Florida alone there were roughly 248,430
children and youths being raised in a household with at least one loaded
gun, and that about half of those were in fact living with a loaded, and
unlocked, firearm.94 Nationwide, the survey found roughly 1.6 million
88 Resolution 201: Government Interference in Patient Counseling, American Medical
Association 2011 Annual Meeting, Resolutions 431, (2011) available at http://www.amaassn.org/assets/meeting/2011a/a11-resolutions.pdf; see also Government Interference in Patient
Counseling, H-373.995, House of Delegates, American Medical Association.
89 David Hemenway, Risks and Benefits of a Gun in the Home, AM. J. OF LIFESTYLE MED.,
Feb 2, 2011, at 7. (“The evidence is overwhelming that a gun in the home is a risk factor for
completed suicide and that gun accidents are most likely to occur in homes with guns.”).
90 Susan M. Connor, The Association Between Presence of Children in the Home and
Firearm-Ownership and-Storage Practices, 115 PEDIATRICS e38, e41 (2005).
91 Id. at e42.
92 Robert H. DuRant et al., Firearm Ownership and Storage Patterns Among Families With
Children Who Receive Well-Child Care in Pediatric Offices, 119 PEDIATRICS e1271, e1277
(2007) (concluding that gun storage decisions are influenced by a multitude of factors, including
the type of firearm owned, the family’s socialization with guns, and the age of the children in the
home).
93 Teresa L. Albright & Sandra K. Burge, Improving Firearm Storage Habits: Impact of Brief
Office Counseling by Family Physicians, 16 J. AM. BOARD. FAM. MED. 40 (2003).
94 Catherine A. Okoro et al., Prevalence of Household Firearms and Firearm-Storage
Practices in the 50 States and the District of Columbia: Findings From the Behavioral Risk
Factor Surveillance System, 2002, 116 PEDIATRICS e370, e373 table 2 (2005) (The purpose of

Foody Note, Round 2, Accept All, Final (Do Not Delete)

242

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW DE•NOVO

8/13/2013 7:18 PM

2013

children reside in homes with at least one firearm stored “in the least
safe manner.”95 The researchers concluded that attempts at counseling
parents by physicians, especially pediatricians, would be a viable option
in the interest of protecting “the most vulnerable segments of our
population—children and youth, persons with depressive symptoms,
and those who have threatened suicide.”96
II. ANALYSIS
A.The Act’s Unconstitutionality Under Current Free Speech Doctrine
Applying the current Supreme Court standard for First Amendment
suppression of speech based upon content, the Privacy of Firearm
Owners Act does not withstand strict scrutiny. The holdings of the
District Court Judge accurately reflected this conclusion, first issuing a
preliminary injunction,97 and in response to cross-motions for summary
judgment, finally declaring the State permanently enjoined from
enforcing the statute.98 While the Judge did note the chilling effect
could ultimately harm the patient,99 the opinion remained primarily
concerned with the speakers’ right to free speech, rather than recognize
a legally cognizable right for the would-be listeners to receive such
valuable information as this Note proposes.
The full scope of the ongoing gun-control debate is beyond the
scope of this Note, but nonetheless, it is important to stress just how
real, and preventable, gun-related injuries in the home can be. One
study funded by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and
authored by a group of physicians found that the use of various safe
storage methods for guns in the home resulted in a significant drop in
the risk of unintentional or self-inflicted injury and death among
children and adolescents.100 Further, this study concluded that programs
and policies which focus on preventing children’s gun access by urging
the public to keep their household guns locked and unloaded “deserve
this health survey from the BRFSS, conducted by trained interviewers, was to identify, state by
state, estimates of behaviors tied to the leading causes of death in the United States. 2002 was the
first year that questions regarding firearm storage were added, due to their “interest in firearmrelated injuries.”). Id. at e371.
95 Id. at e374.
96 Id.
97 After deciding that the statute’s restriction of medical practitioners’ speech was contentbased, the court determined the State’s interests in protecting the privacy rights of firearm owners
was insufficiently compelling to justify burdening protected expression. Wollschlaeger v. Farmer,
814 F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1379, 1381 (S.D. Fla. 2011). Further, the court ruled it was likely to fail
strict judicial scrutiny because the statute is not the least restrictive means in furtherance the
State’s interest. Id. at 1381.
98 Wollschlaeger v. Farmer, 880 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1269 (S.D. Fla. 2012).
99 Id. at 1267.
100 Grossman et al., Gun Storage Practices and Risk of Youth Suicide and Unintentional
Firearm Injuries, 293 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 707 (2005).
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further attention” as one strategy in the quest for firearm injury
prevention.101 While the effectiveness of counseling and public
education campaigns promoting safe storage has not yet yielded
conclusive statistical data, one study conducted in North Carolina
suggested the importance of tailoring the discussion based upon the
individual’s situation and level of risk.102 The necessity of this
unrestricted dialogue between the doctor and patient undercuts the
viability of an alternative scenario in which the doctor lectures generally
about gun safety without making any meaningful inquiries.103
The Florida Attorney General initially104 offered two purported
justifications for the statute: (1) the protection of the privacy rights of
patients and patients’ families, and (2) the Second Amendment rights of
Floridians, which are allegedly burdened by these inquiries from
physicians.105 The State analogized the challenged Act to another
Florida statute that forbids an employer from violating the privacy
rights of its employees, customers, or invitees by inquiring about the
presence of firearms in their vehicles parked in its parking lot.106 While
the portions regarding the privacy rights of the employees survived
scrutiny in the Florida district courts, the section of the statute
applicable to the customers was enjoined as unconstitutional.107
The asserted state interest in safeguarding individuals’ privacy
rights is fatally flawed. For example, it failed to salvage the statute at
issue in Sorrell, despite Vermont asserting the purported privacy rights
of physicians.108 The Supreme Court bristled at the State using privacy
rights to try to justify a suppression of speech, summarily rejecting this
argument as a “manipulation” to reinforce “just those ideas the
101
102

Id.
Tamera Coyne-Beasley et al., Love Our Kids, Lock Your Guns: A Community-Based
Firearm Safety Counseling & Gun Lock Distribution Program, 155 ARCH PEDIATRIC
ADOLESCENT MED. 659 (2001). The importance of a dialogue is further supported by Donald
Braham and Dan M. Kahan’s explanation of “culturally partisan forms of trust.” They propose
that an individual’s risk beliefs are heavily influenced by information from those they trust,
relying upon others to “tell them which risk claims are serious and which specious.” Donald
Braham & Dan M. Kahan, Overcoming the Fear of Guns, the Fear of Gun Control, and the Fear
of Cultural Politics: Constructing a Better Gun Debate, 55 EMORY L. J. 569, 576 (2006).
103 Plaintiff’s Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 12, Wollschlaeger v. Farmer,
814 F. Supp. 2d 1367 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (No. 11-22026-civ).
104 At the summary judgment stage, the State asserted a third justification, arguing the bill is
an anti-discrimination bill, to protect gun owners from their doctors. See Wollschlaeger v.
Farmer, 880 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1256 (S.D. Fla. 2012).
105 Response of Defendants to Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Wollschlaeger v. Farmer,
814 F. Supp. 2d 1367 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (No. 11-22026-civ).
106 FLA. STAT. § 790.251 (4)(b) (2008).
107 Florida Retail Fed’n, Inc. v. Attorney Gen. of Florida, 576 F. Supp. 2d 1281 (N.D. Fla.
2008), final judgment entered, 576 F. Supp. 2d. 1301 (N.D. Fla. 2008).
108 Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2762 (2011); see also Cox Broad. Corp. v.
Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (analyzing the collision of claims of privacy and those of the free
press).
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government prefers.”109 The infirmity lay mostly in the statute’s limited
proscriptions, confining its non-disclosure provision to certain speakers
with particular purposes, while allowing all others access to unrestricted
disclosures.110 Likewise, in the statute at issue in this case, doctors are
only barred from inquiries surrounding firearm ownership, while all
other private personal matters remain fair game for questioning.
B.The Limits of Second Amendment Jurisprudence and
Accompanying Interests
The Supreme Court held in 2010 that the constitutional right to
keep and bear arms was “fundamental to our scheme of ordered
liberty,”111 and as such the Second Amendment was just as applicable to
the states as the federal government.112 Underscoring its 2008 holding in
District of Columbia v. Heller, in which the Court struck down a citywide ban on household possession of firearms,113 the McDonald Court
again rejected an attempt to outlaw handgun possession, this time
striking down a state statute due to its conclusion that gun possession
for self-defense was a protected right.114 However, this right was
promptly cabined by the Court, as remaining subject to restrictions on
the manner of possession.115 Though recent Second Amendment
jurisprudence may call into question a state-based attempt at strict
firearm prohibitions, it should not be read to undermine the
constitutionality of Florida’s existent gun-control safe storage measures,
which are permissible “manner” restrictions.116
Given the judicially and statutorily circumscribed scope of the
Second Amendment, relying on the right to keep and bear arms as a
valid justification for the Florida Privacy of Firearm Owners Act is
subject to two fatal infirmities. While the Second Amendment right to
arms remains alive and well, those rights are unaffected by the Act in
question—and nevertheless, the health, safety, and welfare of the
patients ought to trump any Second Amendment questions. First, the
physicians’ mere inquiries and recording of patients’ firearm ownership
109
110
111

Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2762.
Id.
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3034 (2010) (quoting Duncan v. LA., 391
U.S. 145, 149 (1968)).
112 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3042.
113 D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
114 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3036.
115 Id. at 3047 (reinforcing the idea that holding the states as subject to the Second
Amendment “does not imperil every law regulating firearms” and should not be read to “cast
doubt on [] longstanding regulatory measures.”).
116 See id. “Safe Storage of firearms required,” requiring that a person who knows or
reasonably should know that a minor is likely to gain access to their firearms, must keep the
firearms in a “securely locked box or container” or to employ a trigger lock. Failure to comply is
a misdemeanor in the second degree. See FLA. STAT. § 790.174 (2012).
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in their medical charts does nothing to forbid or interfere with firearm
ownership. An inquiry into ownership, household possession, and safe
storage of firearms are all permissible limitations on a right that has
already been statutorily confined in scope by the State of Florida.117
Second, the physicians themselves are not government actors, nor are
they reporting any such findings to any government agency or body
such that this information would have any practical effect upon an
individual’s right to purchase, license, or possess a firearm.
Interestingly, despite the Bill receiving the endorsement of
Governor Scott, it is arguably at odds with the Tea Party’s own
foundational tenets. The “grassroots organization” articulates its
philosophy as being “powered by activism and civic responsibility at
the local level,” while pushing for limited government involvement or
infringement of any personal liberties.118 The Act, both in theory and in
its operative effect, is a government-centered burdening of health care
professionals’ personal right to free speech and ability to exercise their
own independent best judgment in the practice of medicine. It seems at
odds with the Tea Party’s own Mission Statement,119 for a legislature to
impede doctors acting at an individualized, local level to promote the
health and safety of their patients.
III. PROPOSAL
A. Recalibrating Free Speech Doctrine to Protect Listeners’ Rights in
the Interest of Health, Welfare, and Safety
This Note argues that another factor ought to be incorporated into
the Supreme Court’s established First Amendment standard. When the
content of the curtailed or chilled speech implicates the health, safety, or
welfare of the would-be recipient, an additional inquiry ought to be
made into the substantiality of its deprivation and the likelihood of the
free exchange of such speech preventing a “substantive evil.” 120
This Note’s proposal is neither an unjustified augmentation nor a
radical break from the past evolution of First Amendment
jurisprudence. An examination into the potential effect of the content of
speech on one’s safety isn’t foreign to the First Amendment free speech
inquiry. As Justice Holmes famously opined while rejecting a free
speech defense for one convicted of advocacy of illegal action, the First
Amendment will not protect a man who falsely shouts fire in a crowded
theater if the content of his words “may bring about the substantive

117
118
119
120

See FLA. STAT. § 790.174 (2012).
Mission Statement and Core Values, supra note 25.
Id.
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
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evils that Congress has a right to prevent.”121
Congress has formally recognized the danger to citizens in
unfettered gun ownership, having passed numerous acts regulating
firearms. One such example of congressional legislation, the Brady
Handgun Violence Prevention Act, contains, among its many other
restrictions, a bar on minors accessing or possessing firearms.122
Ironically, the Florida State Legislature made history in 1989, as
the first state to enact safe-storage laws—later followed by over a dozen
states—in the interest of protecting children from guns in the home.123
The Florida Legislature enacted these gun control laws upon finding
that “a tragically large number of Florida children have been
accidentally killed or seriously injured by negligently stored firearms;
that placing firearms within the reach or easy access of children is
irresponsible, encourages such accidents, and should be prohibited; and
that legislative action is necessary to protect the safety of our
children.”124 The existence of such a law serves as clear evidence of the
State’s own willingness to burden or restrict gun ownership when it
comes to a child’s safety. It further undercuts any argument by Florida
that child health, safety, and welfare are not compelling interests at
issue here. Indeed, physicians are doing nothing more than inquiring as
to whether their patients are aware of, and complying with, Florida State
Law.
Moreover, Florida’s own Constitution injects a statutory
qualification on the rights of gun ownership, emphasizing that such a
right is not absolute. The present text of the Florida Constitution states
“[t]he right of the people to keep and bear arms in defense of
themselves and of the lawful authority of the state shall not be infringed,
except that the manner of bearing arms may be regulated by law.”125

121 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (rejecting a First Amendment defense for
a World War I protestor convicted under the 1917 Espionage Act for printing and circulating a
tract in opposition to the draft, as advocacy of illegal action). Although this concept owes its
origin to Schenck, the “clear and present danger” test remained somewhat amorphous until 1969,
when the Supreme Court pronounced that advocacy of illegal action meant speech “directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.” See
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). However, in 1978, the Court again addressed
“Mr. Justice Holmes’ test,” explaining that it cannot be applied mechanically, but instead requires
“a court to make its own inquiry into the imminence or magnitude of the danger said to flow from
the particular utterance.” Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 842–43
(1978).
122 18 U.S.C.A. § 922 (x)(1)(2).
123 MARK V. TUSHNET, OUT OF RANGE: WHY THE CONSTITUTION CAN’T END THE BATTLE
OVER GUNS 99 (2007).
124 FLA. STAT. § 790.174 (2012) (requiring that a person “who knows or reasonably should
know that a minor is likely to gain access to the firearm . . . shall keep the firearm in a securely
locked box or container or in a location which a reasonable person would believe to be secure or
shall secure it with a trigger lock”).
125 FLA. CONST. Art I, § 8(a) (2008) (emphasis added).
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The State, in its defense of the statute, quietly pronounced in a footnote
that the right to “keep” arms is the “primary constitutional right at issue
in this litigation.”126 As such, this Note would be remiss to ignore the
Second Amendment argument percolating beneath the surface of this
legal controversy.
As it stands now, such laws promoting safe gun storage alone may
be insufficient to protect the populace due to the difficulty and
ineffectiveness of enforcing compliance with such laws—violations
only come to light after some horrific accident.127 Likewise, a doctor
truly concerned with a patient’s best interests would certainly prefer to
prevent a firearm-related tragedy, rather than be faced with the task of
treating its victim after-the-fact.128 Recalling that First Amendment
jurisprudence categorically rejects the use of free speech as a defense to
the advocacy of illegal action, the Court should embrace the doctors’
advocacy of patients’ lawful adherence to their gun storage laws—a
course of conduct in which the State has a statutorily-proscribed, vested
interest.
B. Supreme Court Jurisprudence Dealing with Past Statutes Burdening
Listeners’Access to Valuable Information
This Note advocates further protection of, and judicial inquiry
addressing, the listener’s right to receive information129—depending
upon the value of the information to health, safety, or welfare—as a
possible countervailing factor against the government’s requisite
“compelling interest.”
In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc. the Supreme Court struck down a state statute
that forbid licensed pharmacists from advertising or disclosing to the
consuming public the price of prescription drugs.130 The Court
recognized the constitutionally cognizable rights of the listener,
articulating that First Amendment protection extends to “the
communication, to its source and to its recipients both.”131 This
126 Response of Defendants to Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Wollschlaeger v. Farmer,
814 F. Supp. 2d 1367 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (No. 11-cv-22026), 2011 WL 4074928.
127 TUSHNET, supra note 123, at 99.
128 Plaintiff Doctor Schaechter asserted in the Complaint that “anticipatory safety guidance
regarding firearms” could potentially prevent gun-related tragedies in the home and that many
parents follow her advice in the interest of protecting their children. Complaint for Declaratory
and Injunctive Relief at 22, Wollschlaeger v. Farmer, 814 F. Supp. 2d 1367 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (No.
11CV22026), 2011 WL 2177374.
129 Laurent Sacharoff, Listener Interests in Compelled Speech Cases, 44 CAL. W. L. REV. 329,
382–83 (2008) (arguing for the protection of “listener’s interests in hearing speech” as a sufficient
justification for First Amendment rights in the context of compelled-disclosure cases).
130 Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748
(1976).
131 Id. at 756.
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expanded the reach of First Amendment protection to include the right
to “receive information and ideas,” underscoring the fact that freedom
of speech “necessarily protects the right to receive.”132
The Supreme Court in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy went so
far as to include, albeit in a footnote, that in First Amendment cases
when the recipients have a “great need” for the information being
suppressed, it would make their case stronger, rather than weaker.133
While the Court did not pursue this line of reasoning further within the
body of the opinion, its inclusion and acknowledgement indicates a
willingness to evaluate the need—or value—of the information to the
recipient within the analysis. Further, the rights of the would-be
recipient are no less infringed given that one could potentially ask for
the information or speech that the statute chilled.134
Another Virginia statute was struck down in the seminal Supreme
Court decision of National Association for Advancement of Colored
People (NAACP) v. Button, a civil-rights era case decided in 1963.135 At
issue was Chapter 33 of the Code of Virginia, which forbade “the
improper solicitation of any legal business or professional business,”
which was construed by the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals as
applicable to the NAACP’s “activities.”136 Those “activities,” in reality,
amounted to assisting and encouraging minorities to pursue antidiscrimination litigation for the purpose of not only vindicating the legal
rights of its members, but also aiming to advance a marginalized group
through access to the judicial system.137 The Code provision was
challenged by the NAACP under the Fourteenth Amendment’s due
process guarantee and was declared unconstitutional for its fatal flaws
of over-breadth and vagueness, and improperly burdening the freedoms
of expression and association.138 The Court declared that the NAACP
staff and attorneys, ostensibly acting in violation of Chapter 33, were
protected under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.139
Under the proposed value-of-information analysis, the Court’s
decision would have articulated a cognizable right for the NAACP’s
would-be litigants, the recipients of the organization’s references,
guidance and legal assistance, to receive such a valuable form of
132 Id. at 757 (quoting Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762–63 (1972)); see also
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (“The right of freedom of speech and press
includes not only the right to utter or to print but . . . the right to receive.”).
133 Id. at 757 n.15.
134 Id. (explaining that “[w]e are aware of no general principle that freedom of speech may be
abridged when the speaker’s listeners could come by his message by some other means, such as
seeking him out and asking him what it is”).
135 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
136 Id. at 419.
137 Id. at 431.
138 Id. at 432, 437.
139 Id. at 437.
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speech. Instead, the Court in a broader, largely policy-based discussion
recognized the value of the NAACP’s activities to an unrepresented
minority with otherwise limited access to the court system, and saw that
Chapter 33 was a potential “weapon of oppression,” implicating “the
civil rights of Negro citizens.”140 Here, while the decision rested upon
the doctrines of vagueness and over-breadth, the substantial interest
burdened by the State was the welfare of these would-be litigants.
Therefore, the cognizable harm wasn’t limited to the NAACP staff and
its lawyers being silenced and excluded from litigation-assistance. This
Note proposes a formal recognition, incorporation, and weighing of the
value of the communicated information—and the potential harm
inherent in its denial—to the welfare of the individual recipients as well
as the welfare of the community as a whole.
In Texans Against Censorship, Inc. v State Bar of Texas, a nonprofit company and a group of attorneys sought declaratory relief under
the First Amendment against the enforcement of Texas State
disciplinary rules that restricted attorney advertising and
communications, arguing that the overly broad, ambiguous statutory
language chilled non-commercial attorney speech, such as newsletters,
informative advertisements, and political communications.141 While the
District Court chose to adopt a narrower reading of the statute, it
admitted that some communications from the plaintiffs, such as an
informative newsletter to the community containing articles implicating
“public health and safety” might now be questionable under the new
law.142 The District Court refused to analytically separate this valuable,
non-commercial speech from its commercial aspect, ultimately
upholding the vast majority of the challenged rules and regulations as
constitutional.143 But had the court given substantive, analytic weight to
the public’s interest in receiving such potentially valuable information,
the government’s purported interest in regulating attorney speech would
be significantly undercut.
The Ninth Circuit has shown solicitude for this analysis,
particularly in Conant v. Walters, a 2002 decision affirming an
injunction barring enforcement of a federal drug statute against
physicians who recommend medicinal marijuana within the context of a
bona-fide doctor-patient relationship.144 Physicians and physicians’
groups, as well as a patients’ organization and individual patients,
140
141

Id. at 434–36.
Texans Against Censorship, Inc. v. State Bar of Texas, 888. F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Tex.

1995).
142
143
144

Id. at 1346.
Id.
See Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d. 629, 636 (9th Cir. 2002) (recognizing that the
government regulations in question “strike at core First Amendment interests of doctors and
patients”) (emphasis added).
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sought the injunction, each claiming injury.145 In affirming the
injunction, the majority opinion focused on the First Amendment
freedom of speech interest and the inherent need for trust in the doctorpatient relationship, reflected in the common law doctrine of doctorpatient privilege.146
The crux of the Conant opinion, however, examined the burden at
issue from a particular viewpoint—the doctor’s recommendation, rather
than the interest of the patient as recipient.147 Judge Kozinski’s
concurrence reconfigured the analysis by recognizing that the real
interest-at-issue belonged to the patients as the would-be recipients and
the State (when facing a federal statute), rather than the physicians.148
This additional examination, lending weight to the would-be
listener’s interest in unrestricted reception of valuable information,
might even have been enough to shift the result of the 1991 Supreme
Court case of Rust v. Sullivan.149 In a 5–4 decision, the Court upheld
regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Health and Human Services
denying any Title X funding—intended to provide federal funding for
family-planning services150—to a health care provider, private or
otherwise, that discusses, provides counseling or gives referrals for
abortion, even upon a specific request from the patient herself.151 These
restrictions were challenged under the First and Fifth Amendments by
grantees and doctors, suing both on their own behalf and their
patients.152 The Court upheld the regulations as a permissible condition
placed upon the health care providers, who are “voluntarily employed”
under the Title X federal funds.153 However, if the analysis shifts to the
perspective of the interests of patients who visit these clinics, and the
value of the communication to them, the result arguably
kaleidoscopically changes. The governmental restriction of poor Title X
145
146

Id. at 633.
Id. at 636–37. The court also recognized that “an integral part of the practice of medicine is
the communication between a doctor and a patient. Physicians must be able to speak frankly and
openly to patients.” Id. at 636.
147 Id. at 637–38.
148 Id. at 640.
149 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
150 The language of Section 1008 of Title X of the Public Health Service Act reads that
“[n]one of the funds appropriated under this subchapter shall be used in programs where abortion
is a method of family planning.” See 42 U.S.C. § 300a-6. Eighteen years later, in 1988, the
Secretary promulgated these new regulations, interpreting the statute to mean a “Title X project
may not provide counseling concerning the use of abortion as a method of family planning or
provide referral for abortion.” 42 CFR § 59.8(a)(1) (1989). Further, a Title X funded-project may
not include a health care provider “whose principal business is the provision of abortions” on any
furnished referral list. 42 CFR § 59.8(a)(3).
151 See Rust, 500 U.S. at 180.
152 Rust, 500 U.S. at 181.
153 The majority decision hinges upon the fact that the health care professionals are essentially
“employees” of the government and therefore their freedom of speech may be permissibly
abridged within the confines of their Title X employment. Id. at 198–99.
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clinics patients’ access to valuable and pertinent medical information
implicates women’s health, safety, and welfare. As the dissent
articulated, the suppressed information is of “vital importance to the
listener;” conversations which unfold between a doctor and patient often
surround vital, health-related decisions which require patients to have
confidence and trust in their physician’s skill and judgment.154 In fact,
this Note’s proposal is not irreconcilable with the majority reasoning in
Rust, and if infused into the analysis, could be enough to tip the balance
away from the government interest.
Likewise, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey, the State Statute at issue compelled a physician to inform
patients of the risks associated with abortion and to provide information
on alternatives, whether the patient requested it or not.155 A plurality of
the Supreme Court upheld the statutory scheme against a challenge
mounted on behalf of physicians and abortion clinics, 156 rather than any
would-be patients. Nevertheless, the Court made a reasoned inquiry into
“the woman’s interest,” but recognized that abortion is a unique medical
procedure with far-reaching implications for others, and society in
general, beyond the individual’s own choice.
Further, in the seminal 2010 Supreme Court decision Citizens
United v. Federal Election Commission,157 the majority opinion lent
support to the listeners’ interests perspective on burdened speech,158
striking down a regulation that forbid corporations from advocating for
a candidate within thirty days before a primary and sixty days before a
general election. The Court rejected the governmental suppression of
corporations’ speech, predicated on the assumption that such a
restriction may prevent “voices and viewpoints from reaching the
public.”159 The Court’s analysis focused on the constitutional evil in
government attempts to prevent the listening public from freely
receiving information from certain sources or to control what the public
may see or hear.160
While the Florida Statute at issue does not forbid patients at their
own behest from seeking out advice or counseling on firearm safety
from their doctors, the potential deprivation of such beneficial speech
nevertheless ought to constitute a cognizable injury to the would-be
listener. As the Supreme Court had explained in the past, the free flow
154
155

Id. at 218.
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). The
challenged provisions stem from the amended Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982. See
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3203–20 (1990).
156 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 845.
157 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Commission, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
158 Kathleen M. Sullivan, Two Concepts of Free Speech, 124 HARV. L. REV. 143, 174 (2010).
159 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 907.
160 Id. at 908.
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of information “has great relevance in the fields of medicine and public
health, where information can save lives.”161
C. Theories, Justifications, and Rationales Underlying
Freedom of Speech
One of the classic theories for why we regard the freedom of
speech as a fundamental right worth protecting is the argument that it
facilitates the discovery of truth through the exposition of conflicting
ideas,162 even when the listener does not initially welcome the words.
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes famously argued for this theory in a
dissenting Supreme Court opinion, referring to this open exchange as
the “marketplace of ideas.”163 Erwin Chemerinsky has suggested that
John Stuart Mill also supported this explanation when he wrote that the
“peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is that it is
robbing the human race . . . —those who dissent from the opinion, still
more than those who hold it.”164 That rationale reinforces this Note’s
proposal, in recognizing the undeniable and unquantifiable inherent
value of certain speech, in particular for its intended audience. A
pronounced inquiry into the benefit of the speech to the audience finds
significant support in this foundational theory of First Amendment
protection. As such, regardless of possible patients’ disagreement about
a gun-safety dialogue with their health professionals, the marketplace of
ideas suggests the exchange itself has value.
The argument for giving due consideration to the listeners’ interest
receives further support from the “liberty theory” justification for
freedom of speech, which argues that respect for an individual’s
autonomy necessitates freedom from government interference.165 The
listener has a right to the free flow of information and should not be
prevented from “receiving or using otherwise available information.”166
This liberty theory supports the view that speakers and listeners have
separable constitutional claims, depending upon whom the government
restricts.167
Moreover, Supreme Court free speech jurisprudence has created
161
162
163
164

Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2664 (2011) (emphasis added).
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 22, at 926–27.
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 22, at 927 (quoting JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 76
(1859)).
165 The liberty theory argument rests upon “respect for individual integrity and autonomy” as
“the foundation of first amendment freedom of speech.” EDWIN C. BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY &
FREEDOM OF SPEECH 59 (1989); see also Sullivan, supra note 158, at 143, 145 (discussing that
under a model of free speech founded on the interest in political liberty, the government should
not interfere with individual decision-making, instead allowing for the free exchange—and
evaluation—of ideas).
166 Id. at 68.
167 Id.
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another compelling distinction—at least in defamation cases involving
private figures—between speech implicating “matters of public
concern” as opposed to “matters of purely private concern,” the former
of which deserving greater protection.168 The Court has gone so far as to
see such speech as having a higher “constitutional value.”169
Chemerinsky suggests that one way to approach this question of public
concern involves determining what “people, in their enlightened best
interest, should want to know about.”170 While such a determination
might sometimes prove problematic for courts,171 in situations
implicating the health, safety, and welfare of the listener or the listener’s
family—under which gun safety would certainly qualify—the question
should be beyond peradventure.172
Another categorical delineation cabins certain speech as either of
high or low value depending upon the underlying subject matter
implicated.173 High value speech, which requires the utmost protection,
encompasses religion, political speech, and the creative arts, whereas
low-value speech—accordingly entitled to less protection—includes
commercial speech and sexually-oriented speech.174
D. Listeners’ Interests Examined Through the Lens of Informed Consent
The value this Note places upon the conversations and free
exchange of gun-safety information is reinforced when viewed through
the lens of the doctrine of informed consent.175 One rationale for the
necessity of informed patient consent operates under the assumption
that information conveyed directly to patients on an individual level by

168
169
170
171
172

Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
Id. at 761.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 22, at 1053.
Id.
The physician plaintiffs opposing this statute also offered anecdotal evidence of the interest
and receptiveness of many of their patients to inquiries about firearm safety. Plaintiff Doctor
Wollschlaeger asserted that his patients and parents have appreciated learning how they can
minimize risks of injury, and plaintiff Doctor Schaechter added that, in her experience, many
parents engage her in discussion and do in fact heed her advice. Complaint for Declaratory and
Injunctive Relief at 21–22, Wollschlaeger v. Farmer, 814 F. Supp. 2d (S.D. Fla. 2011) (No.
11CV22026).
173 See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 22, at 986. Professor Chemerinsky maintains that
these low-value categories of protected speech are essentially drawn from value judgments made
by the Supreme Court. Id. at 987.
174 Id. at 986.
175 See, e.g., Karp v. Cooley, 493 F.2d 408, 419–20 (5th Cir. 1975) (explaining that the longstanding common law doctrine of informed consent requires a patient be given the chance to
make a knowledgeable and informed decision, and rests upon respect for the patient as a free
individual). The doctrine has been applauded as positively increasing doctor-patient
communication as well as the individual’s sense of autonomy and integrity. See Susan K. Gauvey
et al., Informed and Substitute Consent to Health Care Procedures: A Proposal for State
Legislature, 15 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 431, 438 (1978).
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their physicians will influence their personal decisions.176 Informed
consent underscores the notion that the patient is the ultimate arbiter,
having had unfettered access to all reasonably relevant information.177
Such communications, to function optimally, require participatory, twoway conversations between the doctor and his patient.178 Doctors, as
information conveyors, are in a unique position of respect and
authority,179 potentially lending added credibility and effectiveness180 to
the exchange of important gun-safety information and guidance.
By intruding on the long-established sanctity of the patientphysician relationship, the Act, while purporting to protect patient
privacy, actually reduces patient autonomy, through a State-mandated
reduction of information available for transmission between doctor and
patient.181 This statutory imposition chips away at an individual
patient’s own decision-making authority,182 which is in and of itself a
cognizable interest worth protecting.
Notably, the independent development of both informed consent
law and the First Amendment reflect a gradual rejection of a paternalist
model of government functions over time, and towards an embrace of
personal autonomy.183 Just as the government ought not interfere with
communications between private entities under an anti-paternalistic
justification for the free speech doctrine by allowing for individuals to
arrive at opinions without censorship,184 the doctrine of informed
consent likewise reflects a respect for individual autonomy and
unfettered free choice. We value free speech not only because we wish
to protect the rights of the speaker, but also because we recognize a
value to the listener, and to society as a whole, from access to ideas and
176 Wendy E. Parmet & Jason A. Smith, Free Speech & Public Health: A Population-Based
Approach to the First Amendment, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 363, 376–77 (2006).
177 See generally McQuitty v. Spangler, 410 Md. 1, 20–21 (2009).
178 R. S. DOWNIE, CAROL TANNAHILL & ANDREW TANNAHILL, HEALTH PROMOTION:
MODELS AND VALUES 48 (2d ed. 1996).
179 Id.
180 Studies suggest that information coming from doctors on an individual-level can influence
their patients’ decisions. See Parmet, supra note 176, at 376. However, the relative impact of
“individually-targeted information” depends upon the relationship between doctor and patient and
the level of “influence, trust, and expertise associated with the speaker.” Id. at 377. In sum, these
assertions underscore of the value of gun-safety information to the would-be listeners, who may
no longer receive such unrestricted counseling from pediatricians whom they trust.
181 Lindsey Murtagh & Matthew Miller, Censorship of the Patient-Physician Relationship: A
New Florida Law, 36 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1131 (arguing that the law amounts to “mandated
prioritization” as “[t]his censorship—heavily lobbied for by the National Rifle Association—
essentially requires clinicians to put political groups’ interests ahead of patients’ interests.”).
182 Id.
183 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 22, at 929.
184 See Sullivan, supra note 158, at 155–58 (discussing the liberty model for free speech
through the Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission.). Sullivan interprets the majority opinion as supporting a liberty model, as the Court
shapes it into “a negative theory that focuses on the interests of listeners.” Id. at 174.
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information. As such, in a context such as this one, where the value is
substantial, it ought to play an active role in the Court’s First
Amendment analysis.
E. Applicability and Implications Beyond the State of Florida
Although this Note addresses the controversy as it stands in
Florida, similar legislation has been proposed in five other states thus
far. In 2006, proposed legislation almost identical to the Florida Act was
introduced in the Virginia185 and West Virginia State Legislatures,186
both of which failed at the time. The Virginia Bill was approved by the
House of Delegates, 88 to 11, but was subsequently defeated in a Senate
committee by a mere three votes.187 At that time, an article appeared in
the official journal of the American Academy of Pediatrics warning that
bills of this ilk were “likely to reappear” and this may be a first of many
future attempts.188 As predicted, an almost-identical bill was introduced
to the House Judiciary Committee in West Virginia during the 2011
session, although it did not survive beyond the House.189 In response,
the NRA’s Institute of Legislative Action promised that the NRA, along
with “law-abiding gun owners,” will “revisit [this] important issue[]
again in the future.”190 A similar bill sponsored by the NRA in 2011191
was introduced to the House of Representatives in Alabama192 and
North Carolina.193 Likewise, in Minnesota, a bill was introduced in
2011 but failed to move out of Committee prior to adjournment of the

185 The Virginia Bill would have established it as “unprofessional conduct” for medical
professionals to make an oral or written inquiry regarding patients’ possession, ownership, or
storage of firearms for the purpose of patient counseling or gathering statistics. See “HB1531:
Unprofessional conduct; practice of the healing arts,” Professions and Occupations, 2006 Session
Summary, Virginia Division of Legislative Services, at 152.
186 The West Virginia version would have amended Section 30-3-14 of the Code of West
Virginia, dealing with discipline of physicians, again making “oral or written inquiry of a patient
about possession, ownership or storage of firearms” an actionable offense, potentially triggering a
disciplinary proceeding. See H.B. 4845, West Virginia Legislature, 2006 Sessions.
187 See 2006 Session Summary, supra note 185.
188 Jon S. Vernick et al., Counseling About Firearms: Proposed Legislation Is a Threat to
Physicians and Their Patients, 118 PEDIATRICS 2168 (2008).
189 HB 3085, 80th Leg., 2nd Sess. (W.V. 2011)
190 West Virginia: 2011 Legislative Wrap-Up, NRA-ILA: INSTITUTE FOR LEGISLATIVE
ACTION (Sept. 21, 2011), http://www.nraila.org/legislation/state-legislation/2011/9/west-virginia2011-legislative-wrap-u.aspx?s=privacy&st=&ps=.
191 Three NRA-Sponsored Bills are on the Move in the Alabama Legislature, NRA-ILA:
INSTITUTE FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION (April 25, 2011), http://www.nraila.org/legislation/statelegislation/2011/4/three-nra-sponsored-bills-are-on-the-mo.aspx?s=privacy&st=&ps= (last visited
Feb. 12, 2012).
192 HB 516, Alabama Leg., 2011 Session. The Bill passed the House Public Safety and
Homeland Security Committee before ultimately being pulled due to protests from physicians.
See NRA-ILA, supra note 190.
193 SB 765, “No Firearms Questions During Medical Exams,” North Carolina Senate, 2011
Session.
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House Legislative Session.194
Indeed, in January of 2013, President Obama announced 23
Executive Actions aimed at reducing gun violence, one of which will
“[c]larify that the Affordable Care Act does not prohibit doctors from
asking their patients about guns in their homes.”195 Shortly thereafter,
Republicans reintroduced bills forbidding such inquiries in to the 2013
legislative sessions of the Oklahoma Senate196 and South Carolina
House of Representatives.197
As the 2006 article predicted, “the NRA has a history of very
successful multistate legislative strategies.”198 After the Virginia and
West Virginia bills failed, the authors cautioned “health care providers
should remain prepared to respond to similar state legislative initiatives
in the future,” recognizing the possibility of an emboldened NRA
spreading its lobbying efforts.199 As such, given the powerful political
forces at work, while Florida was the first state to enact this legislation,
it may not be the last.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s current First Amendment right of free speech
jurisprudence subjects any governmental burdening of speech based
upon content to strict scrutiny. This analysis limits the examination to
whether the state has proven a compelling interest and has narrowly
drawn the statute, as necessary to the solution.200 Absent from this
analysis is any examination into the potential value of speech to the
would-be listener, who is effectively denied information otherwise
communicated. In the case of speech possessing some measure of
quantifiable value to the listener’s health, safety, or welfare, the
detriment to the recipient ought to play an active role in the
constitutional standard.
Given the statistical support buttressing the medical community’s
assertion that household gun ownership coupled with improper storage,
particularly when not locked or unloaded, poses a major, quantifiably
proven danger to health and safety of members of the household, the
deprivation of such information ought to actively figure into a court’s
analysis of the constitutionality of the Privacy of Gun Owners’ Act.
While the physician plaintiffs rightly won their permanent
194
195

H.F. 1717, Minnesota, 87th sess. (2011)
Press Release, Now is the Time: Gun Violence Reduction Executive Actions, The White
House,
Jan.
16,
2013,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/wh_now_is_the_time_actions.pdf.
196 HB 2022, Oklahoma Leg., 2013 Session.
197 H. 3416, South Carolina Leg., 2013 Session.
198 See Vernick, supra note 188.
199 Id.
200 See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011).
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injunction based upon facial unconstitutionality at the district court
level, the outcome on appeal in the Eleventh Circuit remains unknown.
Formally adopting the additional factor proposed by this Note into the
strict scrutiny standard for content-based suppression of free speech
implicating the listener’s health, safety, or welfare would, in effect,
make the District Court’s ruling appellate-proof, while simultaneously
providing necessary reinforcement against possible, future state
legislative attempts at First Amendment encroachment of this ilk.

